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abstract
This article aims to broaden our knowledge of Muslims’ approaches to the idea 
of paternity, paying attention to the legal doctrine relating to situations in which 
the established social order is transgressed or put at risk, circumstances that tend to 
be dealt with at length in chapters concerning zinà (fornication or non-legal sexual 
relation) in works of Islamic jurisprudence. To this end, a specific chronological 
and geographical context has been selected, that of al-Andalus, the study of which 
constitutes a model for analysis that is applicable, both as a model and in its results, 
to other Islamic societies in the same period. Most Muslim jurists in al-Andalus 
belonged to the Maliki school, one of the four Sunni or orthodox juridical schools. 
The doctrine of the minority, i.e. the Zahiri legal school, is also taken into account1.
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1. Research for this paper has been carried out within the research project “Sexual taboos and family 
structures: sharia and sexual ethics in the pre-modern Islamic world (IIIth/IXth-VIIth/XIIIth centuries)”, 
directed by Dr. Cristina de la Puente and financed by the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation 
(FF12010-16314).
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1. Paternity
Pre-modern Islamic social order rests upon the dual premise of male domination 
and the patrilineal transmission of genealogy, and its main organisational structure 
is the family. This order is expressed around the principle of al-walad li-l-firash (lit. 
“the child belongs to the bridal bed”) according to which only children born within 
marriage or concubinage are legitimate2. Children born within marriage are always 
attributed to the mother’s husband. In concubinage, however, the offspring have to 
receive the tacit or explicit recognition of the progenitor in order to enjoy legitimacy, 
thereby limiting the universality of the above principle. It is thus fundamental to 
study the concept of paternity to establish the family structures and nature of the 
Islamic social order, and hence the choice of the theme this work is devoted to3.
There are various avenues —both thematic and disciplinary— whereby the 
concept of paternity in Islam can be approached4. This article aims to broaden 
our knowledge of Muslims’ approaches to the idea of paternity, paying attention 
to the legal doctrine relating to situations in which the established social order is 
transgressed or put at risk, circumstances that tend to be dealt with at length in 
chapters concerning zinà (fornication or non-legal sexual relation) in works of 
Islamic jurisprudence. To this end, a specific chronological and geographical context 
has been selected, that of al-Andalus, the study of which constitutes a model for 
analysis that is applicable, both as a model and in its results, to other Islamic societies 
in the same period. 
Most Muslim jurists in al-Andalus belonged to the Maliki school, one of the four 
Sunni or orthodox juridical schools, along with the Hanafi, Shafi`i and Hanbali 
schools. The doctrine of this school, whose founder is considered to be the jurist 
and traditionist from Medina Malik b. Anas (d. 179/795)5, held official status in 
al-Andalus and its doctrine was exclusively applied there as against the rest of 
the schools6. This trait differentiates Andalusi juridical practice from that of other 
2. On this principle and the purposes it came to serve see: Landau-Tasseron, Ella. “Adoption, 
acknowledgement of paternity and false genealogical claims in Arabian and Islamic societies”. Bulletin of 
the School of Oriental and African Studies, 66 (2003): 169-192, especially, 176-180.
3. Which does not amount to holding that maternity is irrelevant. On conceptions about maternity 
prevalent in Islamic societies and their representation through Arabic literary texts see the contribution 
by Isabel Toral in this same issue. For the case of al-Andalus see: Marín, Manuela. “Maternidad y 
relaciones materno-filiales”, Mujeres en al-Andalus. Estudios Onomástico-Biográficos de al-Andalus. Madrid: 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2000: IX, 504-538; Marín, Manuela. “El parentesco 
materno”, Mujeres en al-Andalus...: IX, 504-538.
4. For the state of research on family structures and social organisation in al-Andalus see the contribution 
by Cristina de la Puente, focussed on the type of family that arises from the relation between a free 
Muslim male and his concubines, in this same issue. 
5. Regarding his biography, the Maliki school and bibliography of relevance in this connection, see: 
Serrano, Delfina. “Malik b. Anas”, Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia, 2 vols., Josef Meri, ed. 
New York: Routledge, 2006: II, 468; Serrano, Delfina. “Malikism”, Medieval Islamic Civilization...: II, 469.
6. Except for the Almohad period when Malikism lost its exclusivity, though not its support base or its 
power to adapt to changing circumstances, establishing itself once more as the preponderantly official 
school after the Nasrid restoration. See: Fierro, Maribel. “La religión”, El retroceso territorial de al-Andalus. 
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regions in the Islamic world where, although one school might enjoy the sovereign’s 
favour, those of his subjects who followed any of the other three had the right to 
be guided by it in their private affairs, which meant that, in addition to the Qadis of 
the dominant school, there were also Qadis representing the others. Although to a 
degree that varies depending on each country, Maliki doctrine today continues to 
be applied in Morocco, Mauritania, Lybia, Nigeria, Sudan, Egypt and United Arab 
Emirates. Likewise, laws of Maliki origin are applied in isolated form in Tunisia, 
Kuwait, Pakistan, and even in the Hanbali-Wahhabi stronghold of Saudi Arabia7.
The legal norm sanctioned by the government of the day or —in the case of pre-
modern Islamic legal systems— by experts in Islamic jurisprudence favoured by 
those governments, does not, however, cover all that a particular society considers 
as normative. Inclusion of the doctrine of the Zahiri legal school is expected to 
broaden and specify our perception thereof in quite a significant manner, in spite 
of the fact that Zahirism had far fewer followers in al-Andalus than Malikism and 
unlike the latter never came to be considered a part of Islamic orthodoxy. Indeed, 
the important intellectual contribution of its principal representative —jurist, 
traditionist, theologian and man of letters Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064) of Cordoba8—, 
and the renewed echo that his legal opinions have set off in some sectors of 
modernism and of contemporary Islamic feminism9, highlight the desirability of 
including his perspective in any study of Andalusi Islamic jurisprudence that aspires 
to be minimally representative. In doing so, we nonetheless do no more than 
Almorávides y almohades, Siglos XI al XIII, María Jesús Viguera, ed. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 1997: VIII-2, 
437-550; Fierro, Maribel. “Doctrina y práctica jurídicas bajo los almohades”, Los Almohades: problemas 
y perspectivas, 2 vols., Patrice Cressier, Maribel Fierro, Luis Molina, eds. Madrid: Consejo Superior de 
Investigaciones Científicas, 2005: II, 895-935; Adang, Camilla. “The spread of Zāhirism in post-caliphal al-
Andalus: the Evidence from the Biographical Dictionaries”, Ideas, Images, and Methods of Portrayal. Insights 
into Classical Arabic Literature and Islam, Sebastian Günther, ed. Leiden: Brill, 2005: 297-346; Calero, Maria 
Isabel. “La justicia, cadíes y otros magistrados”, El reino nazarí de Granada (1232-1492). Sociedad, vida y 
cultura, Maria Jesús Viguera, ed. Madrid: Espasa Calpe, 2000: VIII-3, 375-381. 
7. Considering, for example, that pregnancy is proof of having committed fornication contrary to 
the doctrine of the official school. See: Peters, Rudolph. Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law. Theory and 
Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-first Century. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2005: 
150; Serrano, Delfina. “‘Muslim Feminists’ Discourse on zinà: New Paradigms in Sight?”, Liebe, Sexualität, 
Ehe und Partnerschaft-Paradigmen im Wandel, Roswitha Badry, Maria Rohrer, Karin Steiner, eds. Freiburg: 
Fördergemeinschaft wissenschaftlicher Publikationen von Frauen, 2009: 105-125, on page 112, note 21. 
8. For his biography see: Arnáldez, Roger. “Ibn Hazm”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Peri Bearman, Thierry 
Bianquis, Clifford Edmund Bosworth, Emeri van Donzel, Wohlfart P. Heinrichs, eds. Leiden: Brill, 1986: 
III. See an interesting assessment of studies devoted to his work in: Sabra, Adam. “Ibn Hazm’s Literalism: 
A critique of Islamic Legal Theory (I)”. Al-Qantara, 28/1 (2007): 7-40 especially, 7-11. 
9. Sabra, Adam. “Ibn Hazm’s Literalism...”: 7-9; “Zina, Rape, and Islamic Law: an Islamic Legal Analysis 
of the Rape Laws of Pakistan, a position paper by Karamah”. Muslim women Lawyers for Human Rights, 
7-15 (2012). Online in: <www.karamah.org/docs/Zina_article_Final.pdf>, last accessed on January, 
19th 2012. This article has undergone significant modifications since the first time I consulted it (28 
August 2006) and cited it in: Serrano, Delfina. “Rape in Maliki legal doctrine and practice (8th-15th 
century c.e.)”. Hawwa, 5/2-3 (2007): 166-207. The current version dedicates more space than those that 
preceded it to the doctrines of Ibn Hazm concerning zinà and rape and presents them as a possible source 
of inspiration for the reform of laws governing these questions that are applied today in Pakistan, the 
present enforcement of which Karamah activists consider to be highly problematic. 
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alleviate the difficulties we are up against when shaping an approximate picture of 
what Andalusi Muslims considered to be compulsory or proper behaviour10 beyond 
the material and written record, given the impossibility of filling the gaps that these 
sources leave via direct observation of the way individuals or groups within that 
society conduct themselves. 
Since I have, in previous works, addressed ideas about filiation and paternity that 
were in force among Maliki jurists11, I am now going to focus on the way in which Ibn 
Hazm defines this concept in the chapter on fornication (zinà) and false accusation 
of fornication (qadhf) from one of his most important works of jurisprudence and 
the main compendium of Zahiri doctrine: al-Muhallà . This approach has the dual 
advantage of contributing a little known point of view to discussion on the issue and 
of allowing us to form a more accurate idea of the relation between legal doctrines 
associated with paternity and the surrounding social reality through a comparison 
of different tendencies. Internal or external comparison of legal doctrines is usually 
a fairly effective method for exploring the practical dimension of such doctrines 
within a context, that of pre-Ottoman Islamic societies, where the task is hampered 
by the scarcity of the kinds of sources which historians of other types of societies 
(medieval Christian, for example) tend to use for the same purpose (archive and 
documentary sources, for instance). Furthermore, Ibn Hazm furnishes information 
about his principal adversaries, the Malikis, which does not always explicitly appear 
in the texts written by the latter. 
2. Malikis and Zahiris of al-Andalus on paternity and filiation
According to Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi, marriage and concubinage 
as exclusive frameworks for licit sexual relations and legitimate offspring, the 
prohibition of zinà and the enshrining of male domination and of the patrilineal 
transmission of progeny, arose in order to reinforce the institution of the family. 
These new regulations played an essential role in the move from a tribal society to 
a social structure based on the family; or, to put it another way, from a family in 
which women enjoyed some degree of sexual self-determination and in which the 
child did not necessarily belong to the biological father, to a male-dominated family 
in which it was fundamental to guarantee biological paternity leaving the women to 
bear the brunt of the maintenance of the system by their chastity. This change was 
10. Of course it is always possible to resort to other, non legal, sources and to the work carried out by 
their students. On the use of literary —in the sense of having a primary aesthetic goal— sources to 
reconstruct past people’s perceptions and emotions, see Isabel Toral’s contribution to this same issue.
11. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones sexuales no legales (zinà) en el seno 
de la escuela malikí: Doctrina, práctica legal y actitudes individuales frente al delito (ss. XI y XII)”. Al-
Qantara, 26 (2005): 449-473; Serrano, Delfina. “Rape in Maliki legal doctrine and practice...”; Serrano, 
Delfina. “‘Muslim Feminists’ Discourse on zinà...”.
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considered by the Prophet Muhammad to be indispensable for the establishment 
of- Islam.12
Malikis and Zahiris coincide in subscribing the centrality of the principle of al-
walad li-l-firash for the preservation of the Islamic social order13, which, as has been 
indicated, is deemed fundamental for the very preservation of Islam. Similarly, they 
agree on the development of the mechanisms required for promoting that order, to 
wit: 
1. Imposition of severe punishments for its contravention, which tends to be 
alluded to with the previously mentioned term zinà (fornication, adultery)14. 
Zinà constitutes not only a serious crime of public order (hadd, pl. hudud or crime 
against the “rights of God”) but also a mortal sin from which a Muslim can only 
be freed after receiving the corresponding punishment, if he repents15. 
2. Limitation of the possibilities for integration in society of children born out of 
wedlock through restriction of their rights to be linked with the progenitor’s 
lineage, to inherit from him and obtain the status of probity (`adala) necessary 
for the exercise of particular legal-religious functions. Illegitimate progeny is 
consequently legally inferior to legitimate offspring.
3. It is important to point out that Muslim jurists consider the commission of zinà 
to be almost as disturbing for the established social order as the publicity the 
act itself generates after denunciation. Accordingly, they establish a punishment 
consisting of eighty lashes for slander or false denunciation of fornication (qadhf). 
Slander not only involves punishment but disqualifies the accused from giving 
testimony, as he is categorised as a corrupt person (fasiq), unless he repents16. 
Meanwhile, they impose requirements for proving the crime that are very hard 
to meet and, at any rate, more exacting than those needed to demonstrate 
other legal circumstances, namely that the accused admits having committed 
the offence or that four upright males declare that they have witnessed the act, 
including even the most intimate details17.
Malikis and Zahiris also concur in accepting the existence of a series of 
mechanisms to compensate for the harshness or, also if you like, for the injustice 
that application of the relevant doctrines might entail:
12. Mernissi, Fatima. Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim World. London: Saqi Books, 
2003: 64; Mernissi, Fatima. Sexe, Ideologie, Islam. Paris: Éditions Tierce, 1983: 59-60. See also: Ahmed, 
Lelia. Women and Gender in Islam. Historical Roots of a Modern Debate. New Haven-London: Yale University 
Press, 1992: 44-47.
13. For the position of Ibn Hazm in this regard see: ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 229 
(question (mas’ala) 2201). 
14. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 449-450.
15. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 227 (question 2200).
16. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 268-269 (question 2225).
17. To establish patrimonial rights and obligations, for instance, testimony is sought from two upright 
male witnesses, or from one upright male and two women, or from one upright male accompanied by 
the party’s oath, although there is disagreement on this last point.
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4. A free Muslim man can reject the paternity of his wife’s child if he feels it is not 
his, through the procedure known as li`an or imprecatory oath. This is an oath 
whereby the husband can accuse his wife of zinà and, in consequence, deny 
paternity of her child without incurring in slander, even though he does not 
present the required four witnesses. If the wife denies the accusation via the 
same procedure, she is protected from the consequences of the accusation of 
zinà. The marriage is definitively dissolved and the child is not attributed to the 
mother’s husband18. 
5. The doctrine of the sleeping foetus establishes that pregnancy can last between 
six months and two years. In theory, therefore, it would be possible to attribute 
to the mother’s husband a child conceived from a union subsequent to the period 
that the marriage is in effect19. This doctrine was in force in Morocco until very 
recent times20. 
3. Divergences
Malikis and Zahiris differ regarding:
1. Punishment for zinà. For Malikis the punishment consists of a) a hundred lashes 
for the non-muhsan21 (there is disagreement as to whether a year’s exile also has 
to be applied or not, depending on gender and status), b) stoning to death for 
the muhsan, c) fifty lashes and six months of exile for slaves in all cases22. The 
Zahiris impose: a) one hundred lashes and a year’s exile for the non-muhsan, 
always, b) a hundred lashes plus stoning for the muhsan, c) fifty lashes and six 
months of exile for slaves. On this point, Ibn Hazm feels the need to specify that 
the punishment is always the same, both if the slave is muhsan or non-muhsan, 
woman or man, which the Malikis consider unnecessary given that slaves are by 
definition “non-muhsan” since for them the ihsan or condition of muhsan implies 
freedom. The penalty for slaves who have agreed a contract for their liberation 
18. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 459.
19. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 450-451.
20. See: Fischer, Nils. “Schlafende Schwangerschaft in islamischen Gesellschaften. Entstehung und 
soziale Implikationen einer weiblichen Fiktion”. Die Welt des Islams, 48/2 (2008): 245-247, where it is 
shown that although the doctrine is no longer legally in force in Morocco, it still serves to protect women 
who become pregnant in the absence of their husbands, or after widowing, from social exclusion. In 
Libya, however, we are aware that the attempt of a woman to attribute to her ex-husband the paternity 
of a child born 29 months after their divorce, under the doctrine of the sleeping foetus, was rejected 
by the court which judged her for illicit sex on the grounds of a medical report that denied such a 
possibility. See: Benomran, Fawzi A. “Sleeping foetus? Medicolegal consideration of an incredibly 
prolonged gestational period”. Medicine, Science and the Law, 35/1 (1995): 75-78. The bibliography on this 
doctrine, myth or belief is relatively abundant and can be fairly easily located by entering enfant endormi, 
or “sleeping fetus/foetus” as search terms. Concerning the validity of this doctrine in al-Andalus, see a 
case that occurred in Cordoba in the 10th century, cited by: Marín, Manuela. Mujeres en al-Andalus...: 294. 
21. For the definition of this term, see infra. 
22. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 449.
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with their owners once a specific time period has transpired and in exchange for 
defined provisions (mukatab), is calculated on the basis of that applicable to the 
non-muhsan and in proportion to what they have paid for their liberation. For 
Malikis, the penalty is the same for all kinds of slaves23.
2. Malikis and Zahiris disagree then as to the definition of ihsan: for Malikis muhsan 
is a free Muslim who has maintained previous sexual relations within a lawful 
union, that is to say, within marriage or concubinage. The category of muhsan 
may therefore cover the legal owner of a female slave, as well as married, divorced 
or widowed, free male or female Muslims. So a non-muhsan is either a slave or 
a free Muslim who has not been married or who has no concubines24. Zahiris 
basically understand ihsan in the sense of “having maintained sexual relations 
within a lawful union”, at the present moment or in the past. Consequently, in 
this category they also include slaves and non-Muslims. However, for slaves they 
maintain half the penalty for zinà established for free Muslims, stoning being an 
indivisible penalty, they take as the basis for calculation the punishment of free 
non-muhsan Muslims.25 Ibn Hazm informs us of the existence of an important 
discrepancy between the theoretical conception of ihsan entertained by Sunni 
jurists —amongst whom Malikis are included— and their action in practice. He 
affirms that Sunni jurists considered the muhsana to be a free repudiated26 Muslim 
woman, which excludes women who are married, widowed or who have lost 
trace of an absent husband. This position restricts, therefore, the scope of stoning 
to death. Conversely, it seems to reflect the social stigma that weighed upon the 
repudiated woman and her weakness,27 adding to the arguments to refute the 
claim frequently made by those in favour of the validity of the punishment for 
zinà according to which relevant Islamic jurisprudence treats men and women 
equally. As Kecia Ali already noted, although the punishment is the same for 
men and for women, a man may have up to four wives and as many concubines 
as he is able to afford, whilst the woman is only lawful for one man and may not 
have relations with a number of men at the same time. Moreover, women are 
more vulnerable to the accusation of zinà than are men, inasmuch as pregnancy 
is considered to be proof of the crime28.
3. As has been mentioned, for Malikis and Zahiris the offence of zinà is proven 
through a statement by four male witnesses of unquestionable probity (`adala), 
or through the confession of the accused. Unlike Zahiris and the jurists of the 
23. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 229-242 (questions 2202-2205).
24. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 449 (note 3).
25. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 237.
26. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 237.
27. The veracity of Ibn Hazm’s testimony can be confirmed through sources external to Zahirism. See: 
Ibn Rushd, al-Jadd. Fatawà Ibn Rushd al-Jadd, 3 vols., ed. al-Mukhtan b. al-Tahir al-Talili. Beirut: Dar 
al-Gharb al-Islami, 1394-1395, 1399; Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 
458-459.
28. See: Ali, Kecia. Sexual ethics and Islam: feminist reflection on Qur’an, hadith, and jurisprudence. Oxford: 
Oneworld Publications, 2006: 68-69. On pregnancy as proof of zinà see infra.
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Sunni legal schools, Malikis include pregnancy as one of the complete proofs of 
zinà. Nonetheless, they temper this measure via a prolongation of the admitted 
time period for pregnancy of up to five years29. Malikis do not tend to concern 
themselves with the matter of whether it is or is not possible to refute the 
statement made by four upright witnesses who state they have witnessed the act 
down to its most intimate details without fissures or contradictions. They only 
stipulate that when one of the witnesses subsequently withdraws his declaration, 
he incurs in the crime of slander and, should the penalty already have been 
applied against the accused on the grounds of such false testimony, is obliged to 
pay the corresponding blood price to the latter’s family30. Ibn Hazm, however, 
asserts that the testimony of zinà presented by four upright witnesses can be 
overturned if four women certify that the woman accused is a virgin31. Given 
his position against punishing the witness to zinà when the proof cannot be 
properly completed, evidence to the contrary from these women, if accepted32, 
would not lead to the male witnesses being punished for slander either. The 
general rule according to which women’s testimony does not suffice to impose 
a statutory sanction is preserved, but its preventive capacity is recognised. This 
capacity of women to influence the final result of an accusation relating to the 
offence of zinà also exists in the Maliki school, though with different effects33. 
Whatever the case, these considerations put into question the frequently raised 
claim that women’s testimony was not accepted where statutory sanctions were 
concerned34. 
4. The differences are multiplied when it comes to defining the crime of slander 
(qadhf). For Malikis, qadhf is any unproven accusation of zinà (viz. without 
four eyewitnesses being brought forward or when the accused does not 
admit the accusation) presented against a Muslim, both explicitly (sarh) and 
implicitly (ta`rid), the latter being considered comparable to the former. In the 
explicit accusation is included the denial of someone’s genealogy, sodomy and 
hermaphroditism, but not bestiality. For Zahiris qadhf is an unproven accusation 
of zinà, but only when it is directed against a muhsan person, a category that, as 
has been seen, also includes married non-Muslims and slaves, and concubines. 
The accusation of sodomy, lesbianism or hermaphroditism is not zinà slander 
because, in Zahiri jurisprudence, these sexual practices do not amount to zinà, 
nor anal sex between a man and a woman. Malikis are also in agreement on 
29. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 450.
30. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 451.
31. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 263-264 (question 2220).
32. See infra, point 5, on the subjects of punishment for slander.
33. Serrano, Delfina. “Rape in Maliki legal doctrine and practice...”: 178-179 and 188.
34. See: Serrano, Delfina. “Legal practice in an Andalusi-Maghribi source from the twelfth century CE: 
The Madhahib al-hukkam fi nawazil al-ahkam”. Islamic Law and Society, 7/2 (2000): 187-234, on 201. Further 
on women’s expertise in the intimate parts of the female body and its evidentiary force in: Shaham, Ron. 
“Women as expert witnesses in pre-modern Islamic courts”, Law, Custom, and Statute in the Muslim World. 
Studies in Honor of Aaron Layish, Ron Shaham, ed. Leiden: Brill, 2007: 41-66.  
Imago TemporIs. medIum aevum, vii (2013) 59-75. issn 1888-3931 
paternity and Filiation according to the Jurists of al-andalus 67
this last point. Another important difference is that for Zahiris the insinuation 
is not qadhf and, in consequence, cannot be punished with the accompanying 
eighty lashes, nor can the defendant be obliged to swear an oath regarding the 
intention of his words35. For Ibn Hazm, the assertion that a woman has lost her 
virginity due to an accident is not slander, as such a circumstance, should it be 
true, would not constitute zinà either36. An insult (shatm) is not usually liable 
to statutory sanction, but can be settled with a corrective if the judge deems it 
suitable to preserve the social peace, and if it is directed towards a descendent of 
the Prophet the latter may be equated with the Prophet himself, for which the 
punishment is the death penalty37.
5. For Malikis, punishment falls upon whoever accuses without bringing forward 
four upright witnesses provided the defendant does not admit the accusation. It 
also falls upon any of the witnesses who come forward to give testimony of zinà 
if their number does not reach four, if any one of the four is not upright, or else 
if their declarations contradict each other38. Ibn Hazm alludes to the difference 
between accuser and witness, indicating that the former cannot act at the same 
time as witness, unless he forms part of the shurta or police. Here, a considerable 
limitation of the dissuasive nature of the restrictions imposed by Malikis and 
Sunni jurists to evidence of zinà is entailed, because, in Ibn Hazm’s opinion, 
only the accuser who cannot provide proof is subject to the eighty lashes, not 
the witness. In fact, the person who claims to have witnessed the offence can 
in his view never be punished for slander, if he does it alone and even if he is 
not considered to be upright39. When it is the husband who reports his wife for 
zinà, he cannot be punished if he comes forward as an eyewitness but does not 
succeed in completing the proof. In this case, he is not required to pronounce the 
li`an to avoid punishment for slander either, unless he wishes to deny paternity 
of his wife’s child40. This implies that the marriage does not necessarily have to 
be dissolved and that, in the eventuality of his wife’s decease, he will be able to 
inherit from her. Both schools, in fact, admit that when it is the husband who is 
able to prove the crime against his wife, if he does not previously divorce her, he 
may inherit from her after the sentence of stoning has been carried out against 
her41. But if he presents himself as the accuser, does not provide witnesses and 
35. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 265-268 and 276-281 (questions 2223 to 2224 and 
question 2231). Ibn Hazm’s doctrine on homosexuality and his divergences with the Sunni schools 
have been studied by: Adang, Camilla. “Ibn Hazm on Homosexuality. A case-study of Zāhirī legal 
Methodology”. Al-Qantara, 24 (2003): 5-31.
36. See: ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 275-276 (question 2230). 
37. See: Serrano, Delfina. “Twelve Court Cases on the Application of Penal Law under the Almoravids”, 
Dispensing Justice in Islam. Qadis and their Judgements, Muhammad Khalid Masud, Rudolph Peters, David 
Powers, eds. Leiden: Brill, 2006: 473-492 at page 486.
38. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones sexuales...”: 464-466.
39. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 259-261 (question 2218).
40. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 261-263 (question 2219).
41. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 299-300 (question 2250).
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refuses to pronounce the li`an, apart from receiving punishment for slander, the 
paternity of his wife’s child42 will be attributed to him. Malikis and Zahiris also 
concur in that accusations of zinà among members of the same family (ḏu l-qurba, 
viz. father against his son, or the mother of his son, or the mother of his slave, 
or the concubine mother (umm walad) of his son) lead to the corresponding 
punishment43. For Ibn Hazm, a person who has previously committed zinà and 
has been punished for the crime is protected by laws covering slander44. To 
the best of my knowledge, Malikis do not show any special concern for this 
confluence of circumstances. 
6. Pardon for the crime of slander. For Malikis, slander is a partly private, partly 
public offence, which is why they admit that the slandered party may pardon the 
slanderer before the matter comes to the knowledge of the authorities, and even 
afterwards, if the slandered party so wishes in order to avoid being embroiled in 
a public scandal45. For Zahiris, however, slander is a public offence where there 
is no room for the maligned person to forgive the offender at any time46.
7. “Avoid the application of statutory punishments (hudud) whenever you can” 
(idra’u l-hudud bi-l-shubuhat). This principle is explicitly affirmed by the Malikis47 
but the Zahiris deny it, as they do the principle “avoid Coranic sanctions 
whenever you can (ma amkanat-kum)”48. Nevertheless, they state that while 
presumption of innocence should not prevent application of the punishment, a 
statutory sanction cannot be imposed either, due to mere presumption of guilt, 
as happens in the case of pregnancy, which, at the end of the day, leads them to 
the same conclusion as the Malikis: punishment cannot be imposed when there 
is no certainty that the crime has been committed. Moreover Ibn Hazm does 
explicitly hold the principle that one must not be excessive in applying hudud 
because “God does not like those who overstep their bounds”49.
8. Legal filiation or attribution of paternity (lihaq). As pointed out above, Malikis 
and Zahiris agree that legal filiation derives from marriage and concubinage and 
does not apply in cases of zinà. They exhibit numerous interesting differences, 
however, with regard to the broad spectrum of unions that would be included 
42. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 297 (question 2245).
43. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 295-297 (question 2243).
44. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 297 (question 2245).
45. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 468-469.
46. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 287-290 (question 2239).
47. Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 463. On the principle in itself see: 
Rowson, Eweret K. “S̲h̲ubha”, Encyclopaedia of Islam... Reference. Centro de Ciencias Humanas y Sociales-
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. 18 September 2013 <http://www.encquran.brill.nl/
entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/shubha-SIM_6974>; Fierro, Maribel. “Idra’ū l-hudūd bi-l-shubuhāt: 
When Lawful Violence Meets Doubt”. Hawwa, 5/2-3 (2007): 208-238.
48. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 287-290 (question 2239).
49. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 268 (question 2224).
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in the category of void (batil) and invalid (fasid)50 marriages and, in general, of 
relations that cannot be categorised either as legitimate or illegitimate. 
8.1. Should a couple be caught in flagranti and both of them claim to be married 
or say they are master and slave, Malikis, according to Ibn Hazm, demand 
the presentation of marriage witnesses. And, if this is not done, consider 
punishment for zinà to be obligatory and exclude the filiation of any possible 
offspring51. Nonetheless, these situations, when they occur, might be subjected 
to the principle “avoid Coranic sanctions in case of doubt”, and become legal 
a posteriori; it is reasonable to think that this happened in practice52, except 
when the members of the couple did not belong to the same religion, in which 
circumstance it appears that the statutory rules were applied in all their force.53 
Zahiris, meanwhile, favour giving credit to the assertions of those who have 
been caught in flagranti, so long as the veracity of the allegation is not impossible 
to believe and no witness is presented to the contrary. The resulting decision 
is that the progeny is attributed to the male54. However, Malikis and Zahiris 
concur that when the allegation of marriage is made by the brother or father 
of the woman and neither of them is deemed upright, the hadd is imposed; it is 
to be assumed that this is to prevent the legalisation of prostitution, unless the 
accused can provide other proof of the existence of marriage. When hadd for zinà 
is imposed, the child born from that union is not attributed to the male55.
50. Jurists of the Sunni schools differ among themselves with regard to the conditions that cause 
a marriage to be invalid or void. In principle, if the marriage is classified as invalid, its dissolution is 
enforced but the progeny is legitimated provided that the woman receives her dowry and observes the 
prescriptive legal period of waiting before marrying again. Void marriage excludes filiation. Typical cases 
of void marriage are those of a Muslim woman with a non-Muslim man or with a Muslim apostate 
(murtadd); of a female slave with a free Muslim if she comes to be the property of her husband; and, 
always, of a free Muslim woman and a slave, whether he is hers or owned by another. See: Schacht, 
Joseph. Introduction au droit musulman. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1983: 138.
51. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 242-244 (question 2206).
52. See infra, subsection 8.2.4.
53. For the Islamic East see reference to a stoning carried out in Cairo against a couple accused of zinà 
in: Ibn Taghri Birdi. al-Nujum al-zahira fi muluk Misr wa-l-Qahira, al-Qāhira: al-muʼassasah al-miṣriyyah 
al-ʻāmah li-l taʼlīf wa-al-ṭabāʻah wa-al-nashr, 1963-1971: 385 and 1619 of the online edition of <www.
alwaraq.com>. Another implementation of the same kind against a Jew and a Muslim woman in Istanbul 
is mentioned by: Peters, Rudolph. Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law...: 92-93. For the case of the Iberian 
Peninsula see: Niremberg, David. Comunidades de violencia. La persecución de las minorías en la Edad Media. 
Barcelona: Ediciones Península, 2001: 183-236; Segura, Félix. “Los mudéjares navarros y la justicia regia: 
cuestiones penales y peculiaridades delictivas en el siglo XIV”. Anaquel de Estudios Árabes, 14 (2003): 
250-252; Roy, María José. “Aportación al estudio del delito sexual: el caso de los moros de Zaragoza en el 
siglo XIV”, Actas del VIII Simposio Internacional de Mudejarismo. De mudéjares a moriscos: una conversión forzada 
(Teruel 15-17 de septiembre de 1999). Teruel: Centro de Estudios Mudéjares, 2002: 195-210. From all these 
cases, one infers that the mixing of communities was considered far more dangerous than adultery or 
fornication between individuals of the same religion. 
54. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 242-244 (question 2206).
55. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 244 (question 2207).
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8.2 Void and invalid marriages. These are considered to be:
8.2.1. Those that are concluded during the woman’s legal waiting period due to a 
previous marriage (`idda).
8.2.2. When a woman has been definitively repudiated by her previous spouse 
but they resume their relationship without a lawful marriage between the 
woman and another man having previously taken place56.
8.2.3. When a fifth wife is taken, as the legal maximum is four
8.2.4. Bigamy, which takes place when the woman whose husband is absent 
does not wait for him to be declared dead or disappeared before getting 
married again. In principle, such unions constitute zinà both for Malikis 
and for Zahiris when they take place despite the parties’ awareness that 
they are prohibited. Ignorance, however, makes the woman exempt from 
the corresponding punishment and makes it possible for the progeny to be 
attributed to the mother’s partner. What is not explained in any circumstance 
is what happens with the filiation when one party acts in ignorance and the 
other acts knowingly57.
8.2.5. When marriage is concluded with one’s own mother, sister or any 
other prohibited female relative (maharim)58 such as the father’s wife, it 
constitutes zinà for Zahiris and consequently excludes the paternal filiation 
of the offspring, unless ignorance can be argued, in which case there is 
no punishment and filiation applies. The Malikis, on the contrary, do not 
consider unions with blood relatives (mother, sisters, aunts) to be zinà. As 
to unions with prohibited non-blood relatives (e.g. the wet nurse, foster 
sister, sister of one of his wives, father’s wife) they are considered to be zinà, 
with the exception of those cases where a marriage contract was concluded, 
since these latter generate filiation and are punished with a discretionary 
penalty, not with hadd. The Zahiris consider union with the wife of the 
father a particularly serious case for which the death penalty is established, 
both if the accused is or is not muhsan, if a marriage contract was or was 
not struck, and if, the former being the case, either of the two marriage 
contracts had not been consummated. In addition, they exclude filiation. 
Likewise, they contend that after the death of the accused a fifth of the 
individual’s properties must be taken for the Public Treasury. At this point, 
Ibn Hazm states that had the accused indulged in apostasy along with the 
above described type of zinà, all his property would end up in the Public 
Treasury59. Thereby he implies that marriage with the wife of one’s father is 
an aggravated form of zinà close to apostasy and that the one used to lead 
to the other. 
56. See infra, subsection 8.2.7.
57. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 246-248 (questions 2209-2210).
58. On the degrees of kinship that prevent marriage see: Schacht, Joseph. Introduction au droit musulman...: 
137-138.
59. See: ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 252-257 (question 2215). The punishment for the 
apostate (murtadd) is death, separation from his wife and progeny and confiscation of all his properties. 
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8.2.6. If the woman should marry her slave, in the knowledge that it is forbidden, 
it is zinà and does not create filiation, unless she pleads ignorance60.
8.2.7. Marriages ended on condition that the husband immediately repudiate 
the wife so that she may be lawful for her previous husband after he has 
repudiated her for the third and definitive time. Both schools consider that 
this constitutes zinà and, therefore, imposes the hadd for the man who has 
acted knowingly, filiation with the last husband being excluded, even though 
the progeny can be attributed to the first husband provided that the pregnancy 
fall within the admitted time periods. The person acting through ignorance is 
exempt from punishment but this does not serve to impose on him payment 
of dowry to the woman61.
9. Prostitution that is occasional or exercised as a profession is zinà and imposes 
the corresponding punishment and absence of filiation. Unlike the Malikis, Ibn 
Hazm does not accept that prostituting oneself due to hunger, or prostituting 
someone due to hunger creates shubha or presumption of innocence62.
10. If a couple perpetrate zinà and then marry, or the man buys the female slave 
with whom he previously committed zinà, the marriage does not exempt him 
from the hadd but creates filiation in the event of her falling pregnant63.
Someone who slanders a woman, then marries her and pronounces the li`an in 
order to deny paternity of the child, avoids the hadd for slander and remains free of 
filiation64.
11. If someone allows another to cohabit with his slave, he is due a discretionary 
punishment, unless he is unaware that this is prohibited. However, the beneficiary 
of the loan is liable to punishment for zinà if he acts knowingly, and under no 
circumstance may a child born from this union be attributed to him65.
We are not aware, from the sources consulted, that Ibn Hazm expressed himself 
regarding the doctrine of the sleeping foetus and the maximum duration of 
pregnancy admitted by Malikis. We must conclude then that he was not against 
this, because he does not usually waste any opportunity to refute the positions of 
those who were his most immediate opponents.
The question arises as to what is contributed by an examination of the doctrines 
that precede our knowledge about the social status of children who, for the reasons 
we have set out, could not be attributed to their biological parents. For a start, we 
can say that the information they provide in this connection is really thin on the 
ground and that the search should be extended to other kind of sources. We know 
that in al-Andalus and in areas under the influence of the Maliki school in the North 
of Africa, it was possible to establish filiation between the child born of an illicit 
60. See: ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 248-249 (question 2211).
61. See: ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 249-250 (question 2212).
62. See: ʻ Alī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 250-252 (question 2213). On the Malikí position see: 
Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 463.
63. See: ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 252 (question 2214).
64. See: ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 252 (question 2214).
65. See: ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: XI, 257-259 (questions 2216-2217).
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union and the family of the mother and that the procedure involved the mother 
recognising that the newborn was hers. The child thereby remained legally bound 
to its mother and to her male relatives —including other children that the woman 
gave birth to as a result of licit and illicit relations— to all intents and purposes 
(capacity to inherit66, penal solidarity and matrimonial guardianship) and was, 
therefore, not necessarily destined to social exclusion. Having said that, we know 
very little about the way in which individual or collective awareness that someone 
had no recognised father influenced the life conditions of that person and his or 
her family and social relations67. Islamic legal doctrine does not permit adoption but 
does accept the paternity claim (al-istilhaq), that is to say, that someone claims he 
is the father of someone else or that someone claims he is someone’s son, although 
the possibilities of such status being recognised were very limited68. Collections of 
fatwas and of legal cases, nonetheless, refer to claims of this kind which can open 
up a window for observing the behaviour of a relative recognised a posteriori or 
who aspires for that to happen, and his relation with the rest of his progenitor’s 
relatives69.
Whatever the case, the strict norms on slander already highlight Sunni jurists’ 
reluctance to impose the Islamic social order by publicly stigmatising all who did not 
fit in with their ideal theoretical definition. Rather, they appear to have concentrated 
on preventively dissuading people from transgression and, conversely, from making 
transgression public. When this could no longer be avoided, fictions of legality 
were devised, or at least, tolerated. The Malikis, for instance, grant protection to 
children born from illegitimate unions insofar as they consider it forbidden (haram) 
to disclose or remind them of their condition. Ibn Hazm, however, shows little 
concern to enforce this trend. When it comes to mentioning that someone has 
committed zinà, or that he is illegitimate because his forebears committed zinà, our 
Zahiri distinguishes between whether the only purpose of such a reminder is to 
66. On the possibility of siblings “of zinà” inheriting from one another see: al-Sha`bi. al-Ahkam, ed. al-
Sadiq al-Halawi. Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1992: 414.
67. Be that as it may, it is plausible that the circumstances experienced by Muslim children born out of 
wedlock in al-Andalus were not very different from those of their counterparts in our days. By way of 
illustration see: Suad, Joseph, ed. Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures. Family, Law and Politics. Leiden: 
Brill, 2005: II, 2 and 404. On infanticide as a means to get rid of illegitimate offspring see: Giladi, Avner. 
“Some Observations on Infanticide in Medieval Muslim Society”. International Journal of Middle East 
Studies, 22 (1990): 185-200. On the legal consequences of killing one’s children according to the Andalusi 
scholar Ibn Rushd al-Jadd see: Serrano, Delfina. “La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 454-
455 and 459-460.
68. In fact, it is not permitted to claim the paternity of a child born out of wedlock. See: Landau-Tasseron, 
Ella. “Adoption, acknowledgement of paternity and false genealogical...”: 176. This would amount 
to acknowledgement or confession to zinà. Also see: Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. “Paternity, Patriarchy and 
Matrifocality in the Sharia and Social Practice: the Cases of Morocco and Iran”. Cambridge Anthropology, 
2 (1993): 22-40; Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. Marriage on Trial: A Study of Islamic Family Law. Iran and Morocco 
Compared. London-New York: Tauris, 1993: 137 (note 1). 
69. See: Landau-Tasseron, Ella. “Adoption, acknowledgement of paternity and false genealogical...”. 
Also see: Powers, David S. “Kadijustiz or Qadi-Justice? A Paternity Dispute from Fourteenth-Century 
Morocco”, Law, Society, and Culture in the Maghrib, 1300-1500. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University 
Press, 2002: 23-52. 
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harm the individual concerned —in which case it must be forbidden but without 
requiring punishment— and whether it is done as a well-intentioned piece of 
advice, this latter assumption posing no problem provided the advice is given in 
private. Mere statements of reality, in their turn (viz. that someone is the child of 
a woman who conceived him because a man had relations with her without her 
realising because she was asleep, drunk, or blind, or because she was ignorant), are 
neither blameworthy nor punishable. Indeed, Ibn Hazm considers that the action 
of one who publicly points someone else out because he has no father is not only 
sinless but forms part of the obligation to fulfil the principle of “enjoining good 
and forbidding wrong (al-amr bi-l-ma`ruf wa-l-nahy `an al-munkar)”. He trusts then 
in the ability of jurists to determine the deep intentions of individuals and in their 
capacity to take justice into their own hands on the basis of their own appreciations 
of what is just and unjust. Malikis, in the meantime, are in favour of restricting 
the application of the aforementioned principle to those who have been officially 
entrusted with being in charge of such matters (v. gr. the morality police)70 and are 
reluctant to countenance individual voluntary execution of the principle.
Although it is hard to stop the actions of the morality police eventually being 
guided by arbitrariness, given that their members have to be accountable to the 
highest authority and that the final legal consequences of their investigations 
depend on the judge, we find the position of the Malikis, a priori, more sensible 
than that of Ibn Hazm, whose doctrine has practically never been applied by Islamic 
courts, at least explicitly71. 
4. Conclusion
The validity of the principle of al-walad li-l-firash is universal, but the measures 
for imposing it present numerous exceptions through which it is possible to slip, or 
remain within the social order when the legal requisites for belonging to it are not 
met, without the actual system being questioned. It would be tempting to establish 
a contrast between Andalusi jurists in terms of their adherence to one school or 
another, classifying the attitude of some as more rigorous and of others as more 
tolerant toward these exceptions. Nevertheless, a close examination of the doctrines 
drawn up in both schools warns against reaching such a conclusion, as both of 
them developed mechanisms of “autoimmunity” through which it was possible 
to neutralise or circumvent these doctrines’ actual effect. It is true that Malikis 
show more concern about protecting reputation, even at the risk of considering 
70. A function that some jurists such as Ibn Rushd al-Jadd regard with suspicion. See: Serrano, Delfina. 
“La lapidación como castigo de las relaciones...”: 464-466.
71. No apology for the institution of the morality police is intended with this remark. As to Ibn Hazm’s 
doctrine, the distinctive moralistic character of his doctrine compared to that of the Sunni schools, 
has been stressed by: Abou El Fadl, Khaled. Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law. Cambridge (Mass.): 
Cambridge University Press, 2001: 208-217.
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slander a well-founded charge. This may favour stability but can also have negative 
consequences, as when rape victims do not manage to provide sufficient proof of 
the crime and are then forced into facing an accusation of slander from the accused, 
along with another of implicit acknowledgement of zinà. Ibn Hazm’s conception of 
the crime of slander has the advantage of liberating a rape victim from punishment 
for slander if she does not succeed in proving her allegation. His position, however, 
leaves many matters unresolved and proves to be contradictory in some points. He 
differentiates between factual truth and legal truth and thinks that true intention 
can be known but does not specify how. He argues, for example, that if the judge is 
convinced (yatayaqqan) that a man who accuses his wife of zinà is lying, he should 
not be allowed to pronounce the imprecatory oath to avoid punishment for slander 
and ought to be assigned the paternity of his wife’s child. This, he asserts, will prevent 
the man from falling into perjury72. However, he does not explain through what 
procedures the judge will be aware of this lie, whilst, as we have seen, he is against 
making the accuser swear as to the true intention of his words in case of doubt. His 
concern for ethics and for the factual truth against what might be established by the 
means of proof envisaged by Islamic jurisprudence (viz. the confession of an offence 
or admission of an obligation, the testimony of witnesses and the oath) does not 
seem to take really full account of the limits of human capacity for establishing that 
truth with the technical means available at that time73. Nevertheless, it might have 
been effective as a strategy for navigating a route among the different proposals 
for interpreting the shari`a that have survived until the modern day, during a 
period (the 5th/11th century) in which admission of new schools within Islamic 
orthodoxy was ruled out74. Nor are the Malikis, whose doctrines have undergone 
the experience of practical application, foreign to subjectivity, since, along with 
the Zahiris, they assume the possibility of distinguishing between those who act 
knowingly and those who are unaware that they are committing a crime, although 
here the distinction seems to concern the need for the scales to tip in the direction 
of ignorance, thereby preventing punishment and preserving filiation. But how 
this doctrine is interpreted and implemented by modern nation-states with Islamic 
majorities that arose after decolonisation is another matter, and it is necessary to 
bear in mind that this interpretation is sometimes radically different from what 
Muslim jurists from the pre-modern period did. In fact they often come across as 
more advanced and more flexible than the authorities that claim to apply the shari`a 
or Islamic sacred law in our days. In face of the high percentage of convictions for 
zinà registered in countries like Saudi Arabia or Iran, for example, the student of 
classical Islamic jurisprudence wonders how it is possible for complainants to gather 
the required evidence with such great ease. Certainly, it is one thing to surprise 
a couple in a compromising position and another altogether for four people to 
72. ʻAlī ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ḥazm. al-Muhallá...: 299-300 (question 2250).
73. I refer, for instance, to the impossibility of carrying out DNA tests.  
74. This should not be interpreted, as it often is, in the sense that there has been no evolution in the 
doctrine of the Sunni juridical schools.
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observe at one and the same time the actual act of penetration, this latter being 
a sine qua non condition for the testimony to be accepted. The former, in its turn, 
does not amount to zinà and is not liable to the corresponding punishment but 
rather, if it comes to it, a discretionary penalty.75 Discretionary penalties, on the 
other hand, must not be harsher than the related statutory sanction (hadd). Not that 
contemporary jurists are radically different from their predecessors but the drastic 
changes in the distribution of legislative and executive competences as well as the 
extensive reorganisation of the judiciary undergone by most of these countries have 
completely altered the pre-modern framework of elaboration and implementation 
of Islamic legal doctrine76. 
The Muslim jurists of the women’s association Karamah, meanwhile, consider 
that Ibn Hazm’s doctrine concerning the crime of rape “is closer to the concept of 
Islamic ‘adalah than that of Imam Malik [the founder of the Maliki school]. It is at 
once, balanced, just, and compassionate, without showing favoritism”. They are 
aware of its possible adverse effects as well insomuch as this doctrine “errs on the 
side of caution... and thus does not victimize any one”, including the rapist, but 
for these jurists the positive aspects have more weight and they conclude that “Ibn 
Hazm understood the grave mistake other jurists make when they fail to distinguish 
between reporting an injustice, and accusing others falsely (qadhf). In their failure, 
other jurists turned a divine law that was meant to protect women into a weapon 
against them. Ibn Hazm’s reasoning takes into consideration the Islamic ideal of 
justice and equity, and brings the laws relating to zina and rape into conformity 
with divine law, without losing sight of the rights of both parties involved in 
such cases”77. We may or may not agree with the advisability of extending the 
considerations relating to the allegation of rape to the entirety of the doctrine of Ibn 
Hazm on zinà, particularly if we think of how punishment for the crime is conceived 
by him. In our view, as a strategy for achieving a reform of the laws on zinà that 
are applied in Pakistan, Karamah’s assessments might turn out to be a two-edged 
sword. Nevertheless, the last word belongs to the people who are subject to such 
laws as Muslims and citizens of a state that has decided to apply them, with all the 
problems that entails. Providing legal advice to these people so that they can utilise 
the numerous mechanisms of defence and protection envisioned by the actual 
doctrine against an accusation of zinà and rape is, of course, a laudable undertaking 
and the best way of rejecting interpretations of shari`a that lead to rules that are 
unjust, cruel and contrary to the human dignity. 
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76. For a concise and clear exposition of key issues involved in the contemporary implementation of 
the shari`a see: Peters, Rudolph. “‘From jurists’ law to statute law or what happens when the shari`a is 
codified”. Mediterranean Politics, 7/3 (2002), special issue on: Roberson, Barbara A., ed. Shaping the Current 
Islamic Reformation. London:-Portland: Frank Cass, 2003: 82-95. 
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